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Abstract: Rigorously estimating the effects of development programs is notoriously difficult. In this paper we present a 
methodology that borrows from "event studies" commonly used in the finance literature to ascertain the impacts of 
corporate mergers.  In our RETRAFECT methodology a retrospective panel data set is created based on “fundamental” 
events in the history of surveyed households, events that are discrete, unforgettable, and important to welfare.  Based on 
the relationship between the changes in the estimated probabilities of these events and the timing of the introduction 
and uptake of a treatment, it is possible to ascertain if the probability of these fundamental events changes significantly 
after treatment.  Our paper presents a series of tests, diagnostics, and corrections to account for potential supply-side 
and demand-side endogeneity problems in program rollout and adoption, and we caution against causal inference in 
many types of programs unless specific conditions are satisfied.  Our application of the methodology examines housing 
improvements and purchases of large consumer durables among 1,672 households who gained access to microfinance at 
different times in Guatemala, India, and Ghana.  We carry out estimations using village and country/year-level fixed 
effects to analyze the timing of these fundamental events relative to the timing of microfinance access and treatment.  In 
our estimations, we find that the probability of a major housing improvement almost doubles from 0.038 to 0.070 in the 
years subsequent to a household's first microfinance loan, and that the probability of purchasing certain consumer 
durables increases modestly. 
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1. Introduction 
 There has been much written recently by development economists about the need for rigorous 
and systematic appraisal of the effectiveness of anti-poverty programs in developing countries (for 
example, Duflo and Kremer 2003; Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005; Savedoff, Levine, and 
Birdsall 2006; Easterly, 2006).  Yet researchers and practitioners seeking to ascertain the true impact of 
development programs face a daunting task.  Accurately appraising the effectiveness of development 
programs is both time-consuming and costly, especially for small institutions that seek accurate measures 
of their impact on clients.  Moreover, many institutions would like to evaluate the effectiveness of their 
programs ex-post  to implementation, creating problems with the establishment of baseline surveys, 
control groups, and other means of identification.  These obstacles have created a demand for new 
approaches to determining the effectiveness of many types of development programs, including 
microfinance. 
In this paper we present a methodology for ascertaining welfare changes associated with 
development programs which can be employed ex-post to program implementation, and may be 
applicable in a variety of contexts.  Our methodology, a Retrospective Analysis of Fundamental Events 
Contiguous to Treatment (RETRAFECT), uses a single cross-sectional survey to create a retrospective 
panel data set based on fundamental events in the history of households.  We define fundamental events 
as those events in a household’s history that are discrete, unforgettable, and important to household 
welfare.  Analyzing the timing of these events within a window around the timing of treatment allows 
for statistical tests over the relationship between the treatment and changes in household welfare.  This 
methodology borrows from “event studies” undertaken in the finance literature, where the effect of 
events such as mergers and acquisitions are observed on stock prices.  An excellent review of this use of 
event studies in finance is given in MacKinlay (1997).  Here, however, instead of examining changes in 
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equity prices within a time window surrounding a merger, we examine the probability of fundamental 
events within the time window surrounding a treatment.   
In presenting the methodology, we stress the fact that identifying the relative timing of events is 
not equivalent to measuring causal program impacts.  However, we suggest a number of diagnostics which 
allow researchers to test for whether the supply-side rollout of the program, as well as the demand-side 
uptake of the program, is exogenous to impact variables.   To the degree that survey data passes these 
diagnostics, or in the case that corrections can be made for certain types of endogeneity, it is possible to 
make a stronger case for causality.  However, any time uptake of the treatment is driven by household 
choice (such as with microfinance) it is important to exercise caution in making causal inferences.  In cases 
where uptake of the treatment affects an entire village population (such as a road or water system), the 
measured effects of the RETRAFECT methodology are similar to the standard intention-to-treat effect, or 
ITE and can often be interpreted as causal.  Because households choose to take microfinance loans at any 
given time, in this context the question that our methodology is most clearly able to answer is "What 
happens when households take microfinance loans?" rather than "What is the impact of microfinance?".   
We apply this methodology to studying the effects of microfinance among borrowers of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) in three countries: Ghana, Guatemala, and India.  We analyze changes 
in the probability of major dwelling improvements, such as upgrades of walls, roofs, floors, the 
installation of electricity and indoor toilets, as well as the purchase of major consumer durables such as 
stoves, refrigerators, television, bicycles, and cell phones.  Throughout our estimations we use a linear 
probability estimator on panel data that incorporates village and country-year fixed-effects as well as 
standard errors clustered at the village level.   
We find using this methodology that microfinance borrowing precedes significant subsequent 
increases in the probability of major housing upgrades.  The base probability of any housing upgrade 
across the three-country sample is 3.8% per year.  After a household takes its first microfinance loan, 
this probability increases to 7.0% in countries where dwelling improvements are a strong indicator of 
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improved household welfare.  The effect is especially strong in the first two years subsequent to a 
household's first loan, where, the probability of a major housing improvement exactly doubles to an 
average of 7.6% per year.  The relationship holds particularly strongly in Guatemala, where the 
replacement of adobe walls with concrete block walls and the replacement of dirt floors with concrete or 
tile floors is viewed as a significant upward step for a rural household.  We also find some evidence that 
microfinance borrowing is positively associated with new purchases of televisions and refrigerators 
across all three countries, although the positive relationship with consumer durable purchases is less 
strong than with dwelling improvements.   These results show that purchases follow loans, not that that 
they are caused by them.  However, when we control to the fullest extent possible in our data for demand 
and supply side endogeneity and attrition bias, we continue to find evidence consistent with causal 
impacts, although they are restricted to improvements in housing. 
The RETRAFECT methodology is quite general, and applicable to a wide variety of contexts.  
Indeed, we argue that this kind of methodology might be applied in a more straightforward way to 
studying the impact of treatments such as the introduction of fresh water systems, roads, vaccines, or 
other health interventions for which uptake is instantaneous and all-inclusive within a community.  While 
it offers advantages relative to alternative approaches, however, researchers must exercise caution in 
implementation, in the use of statistical tests, and in interpretation of results under varying treatments and 
treatment conditions.   
The next section provides a brief review of the impact study literature, and how different impact 
methodologies have been applied to an analysis of microfinance.  Section 3 considers our field research 
context, methodology, and econometric model.  Section 4 presents our results, and Section 5 concludes 
with suggestions and caveats about the appropriateness of our approach to other contexts. 
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2. Impact Methodologies and Microfinance 
Historically, researchers have used a number of methodologies to ascertain the impact of 
microfinance.  Each offers advantages and disadvantages in terms of cost, accessibility of data, and 
unbiasedness of impact estimates.  One traditional methodology, for example, has been a before-and-
after analysis of a treatment group relative to an ostensibly similar sample of individuals outside the 
treatment.  An analysis of the "difference-in-differences" in this context is used to capture the difference 
in change among impact variables within the treatment group (see, for example, van de Walle, 1999 or 
Banerjee and Duflo 2004 for an application to the relaxation of credit constraints in Indian firms).  
While such studies are relatively straightforward to carry out, they require pre-treatment data for both 
treated and untreated populations, and are thus often time consuming to practitioners.   
Matching and propensity score methods attempt to create artificial controls in order to identify 
treatment effects.  Gómez and Santor (2003), for example, use a statistical matching model to identify 
the effect of group lending relative to individual lending among 1,389 borrowers in a Canadian lending 
institution.  However, analyses performed without a randomly chosen treatment and control groups can 
lead to impact bias from self-selection into the treatment based on unobservables, such as 
entrepreneurial drive or a predilection for self-improvement, or even raw IQ.  Microfinance borrowers, 
in particular, are a self-selected group who are likely to possess characteristics that differ from the 
population norm.  For example, entrepreneurial drive is likely to be much stronger among those seeking 
microfinance loans than a typical subject of a survey, and even a typical entrepreneur.  As a result, 
problems with omitted variable bias are likely to cause an overestimation of treatment effects from 
microfinance. 
Some have tried to skirt these problems by comparing old members of a treatment group with 
newer members, such as using newly enrolled  or "pipeline" borrowers in a microfinance program as a 
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control group for old borrowers (Coleman 1999).1    This had been the approach undertaken in some 
research on microfinance, including some of the early studies of the AIMS (USAID) research project, as 
well as Copestake et al (2001).  But as Karlan (2001) and Karlan and Alexander-Tedeschi (2006) point 
out, this kind of approach can suffer from ‘attrition bias’ in which the performance of old borrowers 
may exceed those of new borrowers because of a hidden qualities in old borrowers that have allowed 
them to remain in the program.  Only a subset of new borrowers is likely to share these qualities, and 
hence the impacts observed by a researcher will be biased by this unobserved difference. 
In other instances researchers have used instrumental variables to try to identify impacts.  By 
using a third variable correlated with program access but with no direct effect on the impact variables of 
interest, the use of instrumental variables can overcome problems of endogeneity to allow for unbiased 
estimates.  Work of this kind often uses the staggered implementation of programs or other participation 
rules which can be exploited by researchers to analyze program impact. 
Wydick (1999), for example, uses the staggered nature of the introduction of lending in different 
areas to help identify the degree of credit access granted to Guatemalan borrowers in estimating the 
effects of microfinance on child labor.  In this approach credit effects on school enrollment are obtained 
using the staggered entry of a credit institution into different areas along with gross sales as instrumental 
variables for quantity of borrowing.   
Pitt and Khandker’s (1998) well-known study examines the impact of microfinance among a 
population of households who were located in areas served by the three largest microfinance institutions in 
Bangladesh, the Grameen Bank, RD-12, and BRAC.  The authors exploit the program participation rules of 
the microlenders as an identifying instrument, which limit participation to poor households who owned less 
than 0.5 acres of land.  Identification of impact from their study rests on differences in consumption and 
                                                 
 1. Coleman (1999) obtains a measure of microfinance impact in 14 villages in Thailand by using a quasi-experimental methodology in which borrowers who would receive 
microfinance loans in the future act as a control group for borrowers that were actually granted credit access.  By including a dummy variable for credit participation by both those 
that seek credit in the control villages and those with access to credit in the treatment villages, he controls for self-selection issues.  Coleman finds the impact of microfinance to be 
small, yet cautions that the impact may be diluted in his study based on the relatively high degree of wealth and widespread credit access of the borrowers throughout his sample 
population.   
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other variables by borrowers marginally on either side of this participation rule.  They find that consumption 
by households increased when loans were granted to women by about 18% of the amount borrowed.     
The main difficulty with the use of instrumental variables is logistical; instruments, if they are 
available, differ from one situation to the next.  Furthermore, finding instruments such as Pitt and 
Khandker's that are strongly correlated with program access in a particular context, but uncorrelated 
with impact variables, also requires substantial ingenuity, complicating the use of a standardized 
instrumental variable approach.  In the context of microfinance, finding convincing instrumental 
variables for credit access or actual borrowing has often proved to be a frustrating exercise for 
researchers (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005).  What is more, instruments vary in their 
strength of correlation with program access; weak instruments yield imprecise estimates of true impact 
magnitudes.  Exclusion restrictions of potential instruments from the main estimation are not always 
easily satisfied, and are often violated in practice by field officers in the interest of making credit 
available to desirable borrowers.  Pitt and Khandker's study, for example, has been criticized because the 
land-ownership participation rule that was used for identification of impacts was often fudged by loan 
officers, allowing some highly motivated participants access to the program who otherwise should have 
had been excluded (Morduch 1998).  
To overcome these problems, the use of randomized field experiments has become 
increasingly common in ascertaining the impacts of many types of poverty intervention programs 
(see Duflo, 2006).  As yet there are few examples of randomized field experiments in microfinance, 
but randomized field experiments have become popular because they allow for a maximum degree 
of exogeneity in treatment and control, allowing researchers to overcome the often-thorny issues of 
self-selection, endogeneity, and omitted variable bias.  One promising methodology is randomization 
among the pool of "barely rejected" borrowers in institution which use credit scores; this allows for 
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estimation of the impact of expansion of credit to a previously unserved group of borrowers (Karlan 
and Zinman, 2008). 
Randomized field experiments, however, face their own set of challenges.  To create the control 
group needed for the identification of treatment impact, it is necessary that some who desire access to 
the treatment (such as health, or education, or microfinance) remain untreated for a specified time so 
that impact can be measured on an equivalent treatment group relative to the control.  This difference in 
the timing of treatment is usually justified by a constraint on the institution’s ability to treat all agents 
immediately anyway, and in many cases a random lottery can actually be perceived as a fair way to 
determine the queuing rule.  Yet it is essential that the control remain untreated by both the institution 
and competing institutions for the specified duration of the study.3   
 The challenge becomes that the longer desirous households are denied a treatment, such as 
access to microcredit, there is an increasing tendency for untreated units to “bleed” from the study by 
seeking the treatment (e.g. loans) from other sources.  Any synthetic research structure is difficult to 
maintain for a long period of time, and short-duration studies present several practical problems for the 
evaluation of interventions such as microfinance, where impacts may accrue over long periods of time.  
Short-duration studies can be subject to the influence of time-specific economic shocks that are 
complementary to a treatment, yielding a downward bias in standard errors.  Additionally, because short-
duration studies represent a snapshot of program impact over a short time frame, they cannot capture 
important dynamics of treatment impact.  Ideally, both practitioners and researchers would like to 
understand how long a given impact takes to become fully realized within a population and when the 
impact dies out.  Movies contain more information than photographs. 
                                                 
3 “Encouragement designs” have offered one important way around the problem of withholding treatment.  In an encouragement design, a randomly selected group of people 
within the study receive a special promotion to undertake a treatment.  If the random encouragement is significantly correlated with treatment uptake, it then can serve as a valid 
instrument for identification. 
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3. Methodology 
The RETRAFECT methodology tries to address a number of these issues, while creating its 
own distinct set of challenges.  We first carry out a household survey that creates a historical 
retrospective panel of fundamental events.  We define fundamental events as those that are discrete, 
unforgettable, and important indicators of household welfare.  Our fundamental events include major 
dwelling changes, discrete business investment, and purchases of large consumer durables. We combine 
this retrospective panel with historical variation in the timing at which different households in our three 
country sites had access to microfinance and when they actually took up loans.   
The ideal sample for a retrospective impact study would include a random sample of the 
population as well as a random sample of current program participants and program dropouts (most 
likely one would want to over-sample dropouts and program participants and then weight them by their 
share in the population).  The dropouts allow the researcher to create a random sample of program 
participants starting after a specified time, and thereby to control for "attrition bias," in which long-term 
participants may show treatment effects than the average participant (see Karlan, 2001).  In one of our 
country sites (Guatemala) we obtained a special sample of dropout borrowers to test for attrition bias, 
finding none, but we were not able to collect random samples of non-participants, and so we are unable 
to measure a standard Intention to Treat Effect in our data. 
The cross-sectional survey used for the RETRAFECT methodology is built around discerning the 
timing of memorable events in the history of a household.  For example, a study on the impact of a pre-
natal health program on miscarriage and infant mortality could accurately collect recall data on 
miscarriages, births, and deaths of children, which are unforgettable events to any parent, but probably not 
on minor childhood illnesses.  Other interventions that attempt to support the weakest members in a 
society may want to use elder deaths as a fundamental event to households.  A study on the impact of 
roads and infrastructure might want to study the timing of the formation of small businesses. 
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Historical questions on changes in most non-discrete events, such as revenues and profits in an 
informal sector enterprise, are inappropriate in the creation of a retrospective panel since their timing and 
precise quantities may be difficult or impossible for subjects to recall.  Thus, unless carefully recorded 
records exist, our technique can be used effectively only with discrete and psychologically significant 
dependent variables.  The type of event chosen should be a direct or indirect treatment effect, rare and 
important enough to be memorable, but probable enough such that it can be meaningfully used as a 
dependent variable.  A balance must be struck thus between memorable events (which are more rare), and 
events which are frequent enough to permit detection of meaningful program effects. 
In our study, our survey teams often ascertained the timing of these fundamental events by 
referencing them off the ages of children and other key events in the life of the household and village.4  
Impact studies using variables such as housing are advantages because the qualities of a house are manifest 
to a surveyor visiting the household, and thus it is necessary only to help the household pinpoint the 
timing of when, for example, a house was upgraded from adobe to concrete.  This contrasts with data on, 
say, infant mortality, for which the event itself must be elicited by the researcher, along with the timing.  
From our data we create a history for each household consisting of these fundamental events along with 
the timing of initial credit access and initial borrowing back to the time of occupation of the dwelling unit.  
The sum of these recreated histories across households forms an (unbalanced) panel data set from which 
estimations are carried out.   
The RETRAFECT methodology exploits the differential timing of program implementation, using 
households in the sample who access the program at different times as mutual controls.  The counterfactual 
in our methodology is identified within the sample itself by the probabilities of home improvements among 
the whole sample of borrowers before credit was introduced into each household’s village.  Thus one of the 
advantages of the RETRAFECT methodology from a practitioner standpoint is the attraction of being able 
                                                 
4 Using this methodology, it is helpful for the surveyor to create a chronological record of births of children in the family as well as deaths of parents and grandparents, years 
which are likely to be fixed in people’s minds.  The timing of these events can then be used to pinpoint the timing of an event by asking whether certain children or grandparents 
were alive when, for example, a new house was built. 
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to form counterfactuals within an institution's own client base.  The fact that all in the sample (at least 
eventually) chose the credit treatment addresses problems of self-selection, because we do not compare 
recipients to non-recipients.  Because we never observe an ‘average’ individual, however, we can make no 
claims about the average effect of the treatment, and we are restricted to measuring how the timing of 
treatment effects the timing of consumption within a sample that will eventually receive credit.   
The idiosyncratic influences of the economy over different years are controlled for through 
country-year fixed-effects.  The idiosyncratic differences between villages are dealt with through village-
level fixed effects.  We use clustered standard errors at the village level so that our t-statistics are robust 
to cross-village heteroskedasticity.   
Care must be taken in inferring causality through the RETRAFECT methodology when the timing 
of the receipt of treatment is endogenously chosen by households.  Subject to supply-side endogeneity 
tests outlined below, we can begin by estimating the impact of the availability of treatment in a community.  
Because our sample consists entirely of one-time program participants, this estimates treatment effects 
that are different from the standard “intention to treat effect” (ITE) and “treatment effect on the treated” 
(TET).  Akin to the ITE, it estimates what we refer to as a intention to treat effect on the eventually treated, which 
is defined as the change in the probability of a fundamental event from a household having access to the 
treatment in its community, among those households who eventually take up the treatment.  This is 
different from the standard ITE, which compares impact across a random sample of households in a 
community over a given time period from a treatment being available when uptake is less than 100% 
within the community.  More subject to potential endogeneity issues, but still of real policy interest, is the 
take-up effect, which measures changes in expenditures subsequent to the receipt of credit, rather than subject 
to its availability.  Because households choose the timing of both events, we cannot cleanly ascribe causality 
to this relationship, but we may still be interested in understanding this sequencing.  We again propose a 
series of diagnostic checks for demand-side endogeneity which examine whether those who took the 
treatment immediately behave differently than those who waited to take it until after it was available.   
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   As a result, an important challenge with our approach is that data must meet certain specific 
criteria for exogeneity in order to ascribe causality in the relationship between treatment and impact.  
Hence, before we can begin to assess causality from the rollout of the program, we must test for obvious 
kinds of supply-side and demand-side endogeneity.  In short, we attempt not to use words such as 
"impact" or "causality" lightly, and we outline the process of our econometric methodology in the 
following sequence of steps:   
Step 1: Simple Estimation on Treatment Availability and Treatment Uptake 
One can obtain a simple idea if a treatment is associated with any significant change on the treated 
population by carrying out two regressions.  These are seen in Table 2 and consist first in regressing the 
impact variables on a set of village and country/year fixed effects, as well as a dummy variable equal to 
one after an individual has taken a loan.  We then use the same setup to regress our impact variables on a 
dummy variable indicating the presence of the program beginning in the year when it was introduced in each 
geographical area.  Unless there is strong evidence of negative supply-side endogeneity, a lack of 
significance of the treatment uptake dummy would seem to be indicative of insignificant program impacts.  
However, positive significance of either of these warrants further investigation into the dynamics of the 
relationship on the impact variables and the nature of the positive relationship. 
Step 2: Treatment Window Regression  
Event studies use a treatment window within which changes in the dependent variable are 
analyzed.  There is a trade-off in determining the width of the treatment window that includes the 
number of pre-treatment and post-treatment years used in the final take-up effect estimation.  A larger 
window reveals longer-term effects, but more recent periods contain fewer observations and are 
estimated with less precision.  A smaller window contains a smaller set of more precise observations, but 
reveals less about the dynamics of impact.  We believe it reasonable that most housing effects would 
occur within a 3-4 year time period after credit access (and our data appear to show a tapering off after 
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this point), but other types of effects may suggest a shorter or longer window.   The treatment window 
also yields the estimated parameters necessary for a test of take-up effects via an F-test in which we can 
test if the sum of the lagging (post-treatment) coefficients is significantly greater than the leading (pre-
treatment) coefficients.  Because households choose the timing with which they take credit, we include 
windows for both actual credit take-up and credit availability.   
Step 3:  Testing for supply-side endogeneity in the rollout of a program.   
Positive coefficients on post-treatment coefficients in the event window may be indicative of 
causal impact, but may also stem from non-random program placement (i.e. supply-side endogeneity) or 
treatment uptake timing which is correlated with impact variables (i.e. demand-side endogeneity).  The 
first set of diagnostics examines the pre-treatment outcomes across communities in order to see whether 
there are signs of supply-side endogeneity.  Direct questions to field directors regarding the nature of 
how programs have been rolled out across regions are important, but the independence of the rollout 
with respect to impact variables should be confirmed statistically.  The first test uses only pre-treatment 
data, calculates village/year average outcomes, and regresses these on country/year fixed effects and a 
variable which gives the year in which credit was first introduced into the village.  This tests whether 
early recipient villages had different mean pre-treatment outcomes than late recipients.  Given the use of 
fixed effects in the regression, however, this kind of endogeneity alone would not bias coefficient 
estimates.  The second test checks for whether the pre-treatment trend in outcomes varies with the order 
of receipt of the treatment.  If, for example, the program was offered first to those communities that 
were growing quickly anyway, then fixed-effects regression using retrospective panels will be biased.  We 
perform this test by taking first difference of the village average pre-treatment outcomes and regressing 
these on country/year fixed effects and the year the treatment was introduced.  If we find bias of this 
kind, we can proceed to run the simple treatment regressions in Step 1 which interacts a time trend with 
the village fixed effects, thereby allowing each community to have a different trend.  If we do not find 
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such bias, then we can proceed using a standard two-way fixed effects regression.  The third test uses 
only pre-treatment data and runs a two-way fixed effects regression including a dummy for the year 
prior to the receipt of the treatment.  If this term is found to be significant, then it indicates that the 
treatment may have been systematically introduced in response to some kind of shock, and any mean-
reversion in outcomes will likely lead to biased estimates of program effects.   
Step 4: Testing for Demand-Side Endogeneity in Credit Take-up by Clients 
The presence of demand-side endogeneity is more difficult to reject, but we propose a diagnostic 
test which includes a “no program” dummy variable that indicates the absence of program access.  This 
dummy variable is interacted with leads of credit uptake to form a test of whether borrowers who were 
unconstrained prior to taking credit behaved differently than those who were constrained (the test is 
described in more detail in Section 4).  If this interaction term is significant, it means that there are 
differences in the pre-treatment outcome variables between those with access to the treatment and those 
without, indicating the existence of an Ashenfelter’s Dip (see Ashenfelter, 1978).  The sign of this 
interaction term will indicate, for example, if people take microloans when they are facing positive 
shocks (perhaps reflecting added economic opportunity) or negative shocks (which would indicate 
consumption smoothing).   
A second diagnostic we employ to check for demand-side endogeneity is to restrict the 
estimation sample to those who received credit shortly after the program entered the village.  If these 
estimates are significantly different from the unconstrained sample estimates, then it may indicate 
demand-side endogeneity because it implies that omitted variables may be causing households to take 
credit that are correlated with credit take-up and impact variables.  If these estimates are statistically 
similar, then demand-side endogeneity is likely to be less of a concern since those freshly exposed to 
credit exhibit similar effects to those “choosing” credit later.  Still, results must be treated with some 
caution.  In general, with any treatment in which take-up is optional for households, it is possible that 
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the treatment has been taken in order to specifically achieve the outcome which we measure, and so we 
cannot interpret a test for differences in outcomes after individuals choose a treatment as necessarily 
causal.  The difference may be subtle: Microfinance and other interventions may very well operate as a 
door which those must walk through who desire a third effect, such as home improvement. 
Step 5: Other Robustness Checks 
 With data on borrowers who have ‘dropped out’ of the program, we can form a test for attrition 
bias by interacting a dummy for dropout with the credit availability and credit take-up dummy variables 
in Step 2.  If we find statistical significance in this interacted variable, it indicates that those who 
continue in the program longer display different effects from the program than those who drop out 
early.  In this case an estimation should be carried out that weights the "dropouts" equally to their 
proportional representation in the program.   
 We can also partition our sample by country to ascertain if the effects we observe are consistent 
across different contexts.  This is helpful in ascribing external validity to positive associations between 
program and impact variables.  Some researchers may also want to interact the treatment dummy 
variable with household characteristics to ascertain among which household types the treatment displays 
the strongest take-up effects. 
3. Field Research and Estimation 
It is likely that while most microfinance loans are intended for business investment and not housing, 
increased profits from microloans should result in housing changes.6  In Guatemala as in many other 
                                                 
6 It is also possible that microloans intended for enterprise capitalization may be diverted into use for dwelling improvements.  An anonymous Bolivian MFI estimates that 20 
percent of its “microenterprise” loans go for home construction and expansion (Center for Urban Development Studies, Harvard University Graduate School of Design, 2000). 
Nevertheless, some research has pointed out that investing in dwellings may not necessarily represent a complete diversion of credit, since such improvements may increase the 
income-generating potential of home-based activities (Ibid.).  As a response to this phenomenon, many MFIs have become interested in developing new lines of micro-credit 
specifically to finance housing (Ferguson, 2004).  In Guatemala for example, Génesis Empresarial, a Guatemala City-based MFI, has a small portfolio of borrowers with home 
improvement loan products that carry average terms of two years.  
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contexts, housing differs from other goods in that it not only represents an important consumption 
good, but also a major store of wealth and a measure of prestige.   Tax (1953), for example, observes 
that social status among rural Mayans in Guatemala is often reflected in the quality and size of homes 
and land.  For this reason, improvements in houses and land are typically among the first changes rural 
households make when family income begins to increase.  
Our field research took place in three very different country sites with three different 
microfinance institutions.  In Guatemala we worked with Fe y Alegria (trans. Faith and Joy), a Jesuit-
operated MFI working in a number of villages surrounding the cities of Quetzaltenango and 
Mazaltenango that lends equally with no preference to religious affiliation.  Our survey of 262 
households in Guatemala took place in July and August 2005 and December 2007.  In India we 
collaborated with Growing Opportunity Finance, Ltd., an MFI affiliated with Opportunity International, 
one of the world's largest microlenders, where 414 borrowers were surveyed in and around the city of 
Chennai (Madras) in the summer of 2006.  In Ghana we worked with SASL, another affiliate of 
Opportunity International, where our team surveyed 996 borrowers in the north-central area of the 
country in the summer months of 2007.  Borrowers were part of borrowing groups in Ghana and India, 
but part of an individual lending program in Guatemala.  Loan amounts in all three countries were in the 
US$200-$500 range, payable over 6-12 months at MFI interest rates approximately two points per 
month over the formal commercial rate.  Credit was specifically earmarked for enterprise activity in 
Guatemala and India, but in Ghana there was less insistence that money should be used strictly for 
enterprise investment.  There were varying degrees of alternative credit access across these three country 
sites.  In India and Ghana, Opportunity International was one of the first MFIs to begin operating in the 
survey region, while in Guatemala more credit alternatives were available, especially in later years.   
In all three countries, borrowers were engaged in a wide variety of microenterprise activities 
including tailoring, furniture, and other light manufacturing, retailing, and livestock. In each country we 
obtained basic borrower information (age, education, gender, type of enterprise) as well as ascertained 
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the timing of the fundamental household events we use in our study.  The starkest difference between 
the three survey areas was in education, where the average number of years of formal schooling was 8.2 
in Ghana, 5.2 in India, but only 2.6 in Guatemala.  The average age was very similar in all three 
countries: 31.1 in India, 33.1 in Ghana, and 33.6 in Guatemala.   
The questionnaire was intended to measure changes in our different categories of dwelling 
improvement: upgrades to walls, roofs, floors, plumbing, electrification and purchases of major 
household durables.  Each borrower was asked about changes in these variables during the history of 
the household, and the timing of these changes.  For example, we asked households how long they had 
lived in that specified location.  If a household had cement walls, we asked them if a different kind of 
wall structure existed since they had lived in that location.  If prior to the cement walls the house had 
had adobe walls, we asked what year the upgrade had taken place.  We tried to pin down the exact year 
carefully by referencing the relative ages of children at the time of the change and by referencing 
changes to important local events.  In like manner we constructed a time series of changes in each 
dwelling category since the time the borrower lived in the given location.  In total we obtained surveys 
from 1,672 households for a total of 21,328 observations in the backcast panel.  Summary statistics from 
the three country survey can been seen in Table 1.  
Clearly, a substantive concern with this kind of survey method is the problem of inaccuracy in the 
creation of retrospective panel data set.   Our survey method seeks to mitigate this problem by asking 
subjects only to recall discrete, major changes in the history of their home.  Because, for example, the 
upgrade of floors from dirt to cement poses such a major augmentation in quality of living standards for a 
family, there was relatively little problem with the recall of such events and their timing by year.   
From the survey we then create an unbalanced panel data set.  The unbalanced nature of the panel 
data arises because the model considers the number of years the head of household or borrower has been 
living in the present site as the defining number of years used in the time series for each household.  Our 
estimations were carried out on data beginning in 1990 if a household had lived in the same house since 
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then, but some households had resided in a particular locale only after 1990, so for these households we 
used data beginning in the year they moved into their current residence.   
Estimation Technique 
For housing upgrades, we estimate the probability of one of our households upgrading from a 
low quality material to a high quality material in the structure of the house.  For walls this is from either 
adobe to finished adobe, or adobe (finished or not) or wood to cement.  For roofs this is from either 
palm leaves or corrugated iron to either cement or tile.  For floor upgrades, the changes we analyze are 
from dirt to cement, cement to tile, or dirt directly to tile.  With changes in toilet, our upgrade is from an 
outhouse to indoor plumbing.  We also look at the year when a house was electrified.  We also examine 
the timing of purchases of stoves, refrigerators, televisions, cell phones, and bicycles as well as discrete 
investments in machinery and physical business structure, often the initial intended use of the loan. 
Probit and logit models are commonly used for estimations in cross-sectional qualitative 
estimations and sometimes in panel data, but we favor the linear probability model, which has become 
increasingly used in panel data estimations, since as a linear estimator it produces more robust estimates 
when implemented in fixed-effects estimations (Chamberlain, 1980).  Estimations are conditional, of 
course, upon a household not previously having made the particular type of dwelling upgrade. 
The general fixed-effects model we estimate is the following: 
   , ,
k
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= + + + +∑ ,   (1)  
where yijct is a bivariate dependent variable that is equal to 1 if household i  in village j and country c realizes 
a given type of event in year t, and zero otherwise.  For the independent variables, vj  is a village-level fixed 
effect, αct  is a country-year fixed effect, the Xijct represents a vector of  household controls such as 
education, age, age squared, enterprise type, and initial wealth; uiijt  is a mean zero error term.7  The fourth 
                                                 
7 We omit the control variables in our basic estimations presented here; our data contain few time-varying variables and those 
which we observe, such as age, were found to be insignificant.  Our results are not sensitive to the use of control variables. 
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term is the estimation on a sequence of treatment dummy variables, ttiT −, , that comprises a “treatment 
window” of length w  years representing a sequence of lags and leads surrounding year t  for household i.  
The treatment dummy variable is equal to 1 if household i  first received a microfinance loan tt −  periods 
“ago,” and zero otherwise.   If tt −  is negative, it means that household i received credit tt −  years 
forward from time t.   For a symmetric treatment window of width w  around the time of treatment, then 
the summation in the fourth term of the model includes ( ) 21−= wk  years of leading treatment 
dummies, ( ) 21−= wk  years of lagged treatment dummies, as well as the contemporaneous dummy for 
when tt = , for the year in which the household first received microfinance.  For example, consider a 
treatment window of w = 5 for a household i  that initially received microfinance in 2001.  For the 
observation of household i  in the year 2000, the data in the retrospective panel then contains a vector of 
treatment dummy variables--0, 1, 0, 0, 0--which correspond to estimated coefficients 
2,,1,,0,,1,2, , ++−− iiiii τττττ .  For the observation of household i  in the year 2003, the vector of dummy 
variables would be 0, 0, 0, 0, 1.   In our estimations we use a treatment window of n =9 and k = 4. 
Many upgrades to homes and purchases of consumer durables took place during the surveyed 
history of our households, but each event is still relatively rare.  Table 1 gives base probabilities of our 
fundamental events.   Our dataset only contains records on specific home improvements in Ghana and 
Guatemala; upgrades to dwellings are not nearly as common in the established urban housing stock in our 
site in Chennai, India.  For dwelling upgrades, the probabilities of upgrades in any given year for 
households in Ghana and Guatemala, respectively, are  0.004 and 0.025 (new walls), 0.005 and 0.010 (new 
roof), 0.010 and 0.025 (new floor), 0.010 and 0.029 (electrification), and 0.005 and 0.021 (new toilet), to 
0.036 and 0.092 (for any of these dwelling improvements).  Thus dwelling upgrades were much more 
common in Guatemala than in Ghana, but these base probabilities are important in understanding the 
magnitude of changes in these probabilities after microfinance borrowing.  Average probabilities of 
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purchases of consumer goods by any household in a year for India, Ghana, and Guatemala were 0.022 for 
stoves, 0.017 for refrigerators, 0.043 for televisions, 0.017 for bicycles, and 0.066 for cell phones. 
4. Estimation Results 
We will work through a summary of our results based on the steps that outline our methodology.   
Table 2 shows results from the simple before-and-after regressions using dummy variables for household 
credit uptake and for credit availability in a household's village.  First, we find uptake of credit to be 
associated with a 0.032 increase in the probability of any housing improvement (over a base probability of 
0.038).  Thus with microfinance loans increase their annual probability of a major dwelling upgrade from 
just under four percent per year to about seven percent--a substantial difference, significant at the 99% 
level.  Table 2 shows the increase in probability for televisions to be 0.025 (over a base probability of 
0.043, 99% significance), refrigerators to be 0.016 (over a base of 0.017, 99% significance), and bicycles 
0.010 (over a base of 0.017, 90% significance).  Other consumer goods display a positive sign but without 
statistical significance.  We would expect point estimates to be lower for credit availability in the village 
(because not all borrowers take it immediately), and indeed this is the case.  The increased probability of a 
housing improvement falls to 0.012 (t = 1.52), refrigerators to 0.009 (t = 1.16), with the increased 
probability for other goods close to zero. 
We first carry out treatment window estimations that show changes in the probability of discrete 
physical capital investments within our sample of borrowers within the treatment window.  We consider 
both investments in productive capital equipment such as machinery and structural improvements to 
business facilities.  These outcomes are discrete and memorable, and hence while they do not present 
the nuanced picture that we would get from, say, profits, they are credible outcomes for a retrospective 
methodology.  Table 3 shows estimations around the treatment window of credit uptake as well as when 
credit was introduced into a particular household’s village.  As we would expect, the probability of 
investment in both productive machinery and structural assets increases significantly by 0.128 in the year 
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a first microfinance loan is taken over a base probability of 0.071, falling subsequently in the first and 
second years after credit to probability increases of 0.087 and 0.078, still more than double the base 
investment probability.  Figure 1 plots these changes over time and reinforces the sharp increase in 
business investment in the year a microfinance loan is taken.  Coefficients measuring changes in the 
probabilities of the different types of investments after credit is introduced into a village are often 
positive and significant, but smaller.   
We now consider changes in the probability of housing improvements.  Our treatment window 
estimations around household credit uptake for housing improvements in Table 4A show no significant 
changes in the years before credit but large increases in the probability for housing improvements 
beginning in the year credit was received and continuing out to approximately three years after the initial 
microfinance loan.  Figure 2 carries out the interesting exercise of plotting the relative timing of loan 
receipt, business investments, and housing investments on the same figure (the data only permit us to 
carry out this analysis in Ghana).  We see clearly the immediate jump in business investment and the 
subsequent increase in housing investment which seems to lag the business investment by roughly one 
year.  Coefficients from the treatment window using both Guatemala and Ghana are plotted with a 95% 
confidence interval in Figure 3.  These probability increases for any housing improvement range between 
0.015 and 0.48, peaking in the first year after credit is received and then dying down afterwards. The 
increases shows that households taking credit roughly double the probability of a housing upgrade in the 
first three years after the initial microfinance loan is taken from a base probability of 0.039 to an average 
probability of 0.079 during these years.  Increased probabilities for upgrades to walls and floors are 
especially high where F-tests on significant differences between the four post-treatment probabilities and 
the four pre-treatment probabilities within the nine-year treatment window show F-tests significant at the 
95% level.  This makes sense especially in Guatemala, where upgrades from adobe walls and dirt floors to 
concrete walls and floors are viewed as a sign of significant upward mobility in rural areas. 
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Table 4B uses a treatment window around the provision of credit to a given household's village.  
In these estimations, the same coefficients are smaller on any housing improvements, but extending 
farther into the future past the time credit was introduced in the village, and still significant at the 95% 
level.  The corresponding plot of treatment window coefficients with a 95% confidence interval is given in 
Figure 4.  Interestingly, the coefficient on any household improvement remains unchanged at 0.028 
relative to the credit uptake estimation window in Table 4A.  F-tests on significant differences between 
the post-treatment probabilities and the pre-treatment probabilities show significance at the 95% level for 
any housing improvement, 90% for wall upgrades, and 85% for roofs.   
We also carried out treatment window regressions using the purchase of consumer durables, an 
outcome which was available in all three of our study countries.  The plots of the leads and lags for five 
kinds of consumer durables (television, refrigerator, stove, bicycle, and cell phone) are given in Figure 5.  
The probability of purchase of several consumer durables increases in the year a household takes its first 
microfinance loan, but in general the individual year lags are not significant.  The probability of a 
television purchase increases by about half, by 0.021 from a base probability of 0.043, that of a refrigerator 
nearly doubles, increasing by 0.014 from a base of 0.017, while that of a stove goes up by about two-
thirds, by 0.017 from a base of 0.022.  (Interestingly, coefficients vary little between the three countries, 
although credit is constrained for business investment purposes in both the Guatemalan and Indian 
MFIs.)  For televisions, refrigerators, and bikes, F-tests on significant differences between the post-
treatment probabilities and the pre-treatment probabilities each show significance at the 95% level.  Not 
surprisingly, cell phone purchases are relatively unresponsive to credit access, as they are likely driven 
mainly by the installation of cell towers and other infrastructure.  Figure 6 plots the leads and lags around 
the availability of credit in a village, and we see that unlike housing improvements, the purchase of 
consumer goods does not appear to be associated with the presence of credit in the village, but with actual 
borrowing.  
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Our diagnostic checks for supply-side endogeneity (Step 3) are presented in Table 5.  Regressing 
average pre-treatment outcomes (new walls, new roof, new floor, new toilet, new land) on the year in 
which credit was offered to a village, we find no evidence of supply-side endogeneity in the levels of the 
pre-treatment outcome based on the year that the credit program was introduced into villages.  We also 
find no evidence of supply-side endogeneity in a pre-treatment trend of more rapid or less rapid changes 
in home improvements (our second estimation in Table 5).  Our last diagnostic is a check for the entrance 
of the program as a result of previous-period shocks.  Again, we find no evidence that the provision of 
credit to a village is a function of an abnormally greater or lower rate of home improvement in a village 
the year before credit program entry.  Thus we uncover no evidence of endogenous program placement 
across our three country sample. 
Our results for Step 4, the test for demand-side endogeneity, are given in Table 6.  First, we 
create a dummy variable indicating whether or not the credit program had been introduced into the 
village of household i at time t.  We interact this dummy variable with the variables representing the 
years within the treatment window for each household prior to treatment and include it in the 
estimation along with the other pre-treatment time dummies.  We then estimate the equation 
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where there are n = 2k +1 leading and lagged treatment dummy variables in the first summation and k  
leading treatment dummy variables in the second summation interacted with a dummy equal to 1 if the 
microfinance program was unavailable and zero otherwise, where ttid −, is the interacted dummy 
representing the absence of a credit program.  For parsimony we use n=5 and k=2, although results are 
similar if we use longer treatment windows.. 
Significance of the tti −,δ  coefficients in (2) could reflect demand-side endogeneity in divergent 
ways.  On one hand it is conceivable that microenterprise entrepreneurs might choose to borrow in good 
economic times, in order to take advantage of economic opportunity.  Good economic times could thus 
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initiate borrowing, but also cause high profits by themselves and thus cause dwelling upgrades.  Failing to 
correct for lack of program access would thus overestimate the difference between post-credit and pre-credit 
treatment variables, i.e. demand-side endogeneity would bias the difference between post-credit outcomes 
and pre-credit outcomes upwards.  This would bias our F-test on impact toward a propensity for Type I 
errors (rejecting a null hypothesis that there is no significant change in probability of dwelling upgrades 
yielded after credit).  In the presence of endogenous borrowing based on positive economic opportunity, 
we would thus expect the tti −,δ 's to be positive.  The true change in probability of dwelling upgrades for a 
pre-credit year would not be tti −,τ , but rather ttitti −− + ,, δτ .   
The opposite relationship is also possible:  microentrepreneurs might systematically choose to 
borrow when prices are low for their particular product (or economic times are hard) in order to smooth 
negative shocks.  Here, failing to correct for lack of pre-credit program access would underestimate the 
difference between post-credit and pre-credit treatment variables, making our F-test biased downwards and 
inclined toward Type II errors, accepting the null of no significant change in probability of dwelling 
upgrades yielded after credit.  With this type of endogeneity, we would expect the tti −,δ 's to be negative since 
with the unavailability of credit, negative shocks would further reduce the probability of dwelling upgrades.   
To test for systematic demand-side endogeneity in borrowing decisions, we carry out a test for the 
significance of the tti −,δ 's in Table 6  in a five-year treatment window on whether they are jointly different 
than zero.   If these interactive dummies are jointly significant by an F-test, meaning that significant 
demand-side endogeneity exists, then our new test for the effect of microfinance borrowing on dwelling 
upgrades would then become the significance of differences between the post-credit treatment tti −,τ 's and 
the sum of the pre-credit ttitti −− + ,, δτ 's within the symmetric treatment window.  If the interacted 
variables are jointly insignificant, then the decisions of previously credit-constrained households and 
previously non-credit constrained households are insignificantly different, and we can use our standard F-
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test differences between the sum of the post-credit tti −,τ 's and the sum of the pre-credit stti ', −τ 's within 
the symmetric treatment window. 
As seen in Table 6, we find little statistical evidence for the joint significance of these interacted 
dummy variables.  With neither housing improvements nor the purchase of consumer durables are the 
interacted variables on the raw pre-treatment dummy variables and the microfinance constraint dummy 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level, and the post-credit coefficients retain similar magnitudes 
as in Tables 3A and 4A.  An additional check for demand-side endogeneity is in Table 2, where we carry 
out the simple "before-and-after" estimations only on borrowers who received credit in the first year it 
was offered in their village.  Here the timing of their borrowing is less likely to be influenced by demand-
side conditions and more by the new availability of credit (for which we find evidence of exogeneity with 
respect to impact variables).  Again we find our coefficient on the increased probability of housing 
improvements remaining robust at 0.030, though coefficients on some consumer durables decline.   
Additional analyses not presented here (output available on the authors’ websites) examines the 
robustness of the findings on housing improvements when we partition the sample by country.  Similar 
treatment effects are found in both Guatemala and Ghana despite the fact that the base probability of 
housing improvement in Guatemala (.092) is three times as high as that in Ghana.  We also tried 
interacting borrower-level characteristics with treatment dummies to see whether there is heterogeneity in 
treatment effects.  These interaction terms are in general not significant, implying that the effects 
estimated here are relatively consistent across types of borrowers 
The final empirical issue which we need to address is that our impact estimations could be affected 
by an attrition bias based on the composition of an institution's borrowing portfolio.  The phenomenon 
here could be that old borrowers could represent a group that exhibits different responses to credit than 
newer borrowers, since some borrowers (for whom the impact of loans could be greater or smaller) may 
have dropped out of the pool from an old cohort.  Our methodology avoids the straightforward attrition 
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bias described in Karlan (2001) because our identification relies on the specific timing of dwelling changes 
after microfinance borrowing rather than the simple differences in impact variables between old and new 
borrowers.  However, any differences in the timing of purchases relative to credit for dropouts versus 
ongoing borrowers would still result in inaccurate estimates for the client base as a whole if we were to 
base our analysis only on current borrowers. 
Table 7 presents results from our Guatemalan data on home improvements, indicating that 
dropout borrowers display higher overall rates of certain housing upgrades, and in addition dropouts are 
somewhat (though insignificantly) more likely to upgrade walls, roofs, and floors after receiving credit than 
ongoing borrowers.   Thus, to ignore dropout borrowers in our Guatemalan sample could result in an 
underestimate of the increased probability of housing upgrades associated with credit.   
Table 8 contains perhaps our strongest case for causality within our data set, using a nine-period 
treatment window around credit provision to a village in Guatemala, with dropouts weighted by their 
share in the cohort with whom they first took loans, based on an annual dropout probability of 33%.  In 
this estimation, we continue to see some evidence of an increased probability of housing improvements 
after credit provision to a village with an average post-credit-provision coefficient of 0.0348 in the four 
years after an MFI begins operation in a household's village with coefficients statistically significant in the 
third and fourth years after the initiation of MFI lending. 
5.  Summary and Implications for Future Research 
The methodology we present in this paper involves the creation of a retrospective panel database 
taken from a surveys conducted at a single point in time.  This retrospective panel re-creates a history of 
fundamental events in the household over time, the timing of these events then being analyzed with 
respect to the timing of a treatment.  By carrying out a regression of these fundamental events within a 
treatment window, it becomes possible to analyze the subsequent changes in the probabilities of 
important variables correlated with a development project or program such as microfinance. 
 26
We think it may be helpful at this point to note where the RETRAFECT methodology is most 
likely to be useful, and highlight important caveats with its implementation.  First, to be able to fully 
attribute relative changes in post-treatment coefficients to program impact, a researcher must identify a 
program which has been phased in over time in a manner that is unrelated to counterfactual changes in 
impact variables.  This requires that the program rollout not be directly sequenced based on pre-existing 
changes in the outcome of interest, and that there be no obvious shocks which drive both program 
placement and shifts in outcomes.   Even to estimate impacts on program participants only, a survey 
should include a random sample of current and former program participants who received the treatment 
after a given time in the past.  If dropouts are under-sampled, observations can then be weighted by the 
probability of dropout as per a standard attrition correction.  
When using retrospective survey questions, use of this methodology should focus on correctly 
ascertaining the timing of fundamental events.  Changes in variables such as profit, revenue, and so 
forth are difficult for subjects to remember, and are often imprecise by their very nature in informal-
sector enterprises.  Major diseases, deaths, school enrollments, and major asset purchases are the kinds 
of variables best used within this framework.  In many respects, this may not represent a disadvantage 
since what researchers (and households in development countries as well) often view as “development” 
may be closely associated with these kinds of fundamental changes. 
  Causal inference in a RETRAFECT study is most clearly obtained when treatment adoption is 
ubiquitous and instantaneous with access.  If the nature of a treatment is that its adoption is very high at 
the moment it is introduced, the effect measured at the time when the program became available offers 
the cleanest ex-post measure of causal impact.  An example might be a randomly assigned (but 
mandatory) vaccination program in public schools, or the phase-in of clean water systems to a number 
of villages over time, where everyone prefers the clean water to what existed before.  In these examples 
theory strongly dictates a clear impact, treatment is instantaneous with access, and if there is exogenous 
rollout, causality can be more confidently inferred.  In this sense, our own application to microfinance 
 27
faces significant challenges using the RETRAFECT methodology because take-up of the treatment is a 
choice made by households which may be influenced by factors that also affect welfare variables. 
It is worth considering carefully what can be inferred from the estimate of the “take-up effect,” 
defined by events that occur after households choose to take credit.   Showing that households take credit 
prior to upgrading houses is not equivalent to showing that credit causes these upgrades, because we 
cannot verify that the upgrades would not have occurred in the absence of credit.  For example, it is 
conceivable that households could have sought loans from family members instead of from MFIs, and 
so the counterfactual pattern of home improvement could have been similar had the MFI not located in 
the village.   However, there is still important information present in the relative timing of these events.  
These estimates provide reliable evidence over what kinds of consumption changes lenders are likely to 
see in their client base subsequent to the taking of loans.  Changes observed subsequent to the availability 
of credit, subject to endogeneity tests outlined here, can be interpreted as more likely to be causal effects 
on the sample of individuals who take loans, for which we still find large and significant coefficients. 
The principal advantages of the RETRAFECT methodology are that it can be pursued using 
entirely ex-post data from a single survey wave, utilizing the sequencing of a program’s rollout as a natural 
experiment.  It can also be implemented within an institution’s own client base, and can explicitly trace 
out the dynamics of changes in welfare variables.  We outline the circumstances under which statistical 
significance can be attributed to standard causality, and suggest a sequence of diagnostic checks and 
possible remedies when different types of endogeneity are present in the data.   
We find the strongest relationship between credit and housing improvements when we use the 
most endogenous measure; namely the probability of improvement after choosing to take credit.  The 
probability of housing improvements exactly doubles during the two years subsequent to a household's 
first microfinance loan from 0.038 to 0.076; the probability of a business investment nearly triples from 
0.081 to 0.209 in the year a household takes credit.  Evidence of increased propensity to purchase 
consumer goods after the receipt of credit is weaker, but coefficients are virtually always positive and in 
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some cases significant.  Exploiting a survey of dropouts performed in Guatemala to calculate effects 
which are representative of borrowers as a whole, we still find an elevated probability to improve 
housing subsequent to the availability of credit.  Future research should compare these estimates to 
those obtained in experimental field research where it may be more difficult to study the dynamics of 
program effects, but where one is more able to make firmer inferences over causal impacts.
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                          Table 1: Summary Statistics: 
                     Table of means; standard deviations in parentheses. 
 Control Variables: 
  
1st Year of 
Credit 
Dummy for 
Male Age 
Years of 
Education 
Dummy for 
Retail Sector 
Dummy for 
Manufacturing
Ghana: 2005.2 0.105 33.1 8.198 0.908 0.017 
 (2.15) (0.31) (9.66) (4.98) (0.29) (0.13) 
Guatemala 2002.0 0.000 33.6 2.648 0.741 0.418 
 (2.09) . (8.83) (3.29) (0.44) (0.49) 
India 2003.8 0.000 31.1 5.174 0.471 0.022 
  (1.56) . (9.02) (3.81) (0.50) (0.15) 
Whole Sample 2004.4 0.069 32.7 6.944 0.786 0.056 
  (2.27) (0.25) (9.48) (4.95) (0.41) (0.23) 
       
 Housing Upgrades: 
  
Any home 
improvement 
Walls 
improvement
Roof 
Improvement
Floor 
Improvement
Electricity 
Upgrade Toilet Upgrade
Ghana: 0.036 0.004 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.005 
 (0.19) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) 
Guatemala 0.092 0.025 0.010 0.025 0.029 0.021 
 (0.29) (0.15) (0.10) (0.16) (0.17) (0.14) 
India 0.020 . . . . . 
  (0.14) . . . . . 
Whole Sample 0.038 0.007 0.005 0.012 0.013 0.007 
  (0.19) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) 
       
 Consumer Goods: Businesses: 
  TV Stove Fridge Bicycle Cell Phone 
Any Major 
Investment 
Ghana: 0.034 0.026 0.008 0.006 0.086 0.097 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.09) (0.08) (0.28) (0.09) 
Guatemala 0.074 0.036 0.042 0.054 0.102 . 
 (0.26) (0.19) (0.20) (0.23) (0.30) . 
India 0.054 0.005 0.030 0.030 0.000 0.038 
  (0.23) (0.07) (0.17) (0.17) 0.00  (0.04) 
Whole Sample 0.043 0.022 0.017 0.017 0.066 0.081 
  (0.20) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.25) (0.07) 
Table of means. Variances in parentheses.    
 
 32
 
Table 2: Discrete Before-and-After Dummy Variables: 
(Whole Three-Country Sample) 
 Dependent variable:  
Explanatory variable: 
Housing 
Improvement Television Refrigerator
Cell 
Phone Stove Bicycle 
Household Credit Uptake: 0.032 0.025 0.016 0.008 0.007 0.010 
 (3.45)** (3.04)** (2.69)** (0.79) (1.33) (1.77) 
Constant 0.076 0.076 0.018 0.01 0.001 0.012 
  (3.91)** (3.91)** (1.89) (2.72)** (0.62) (1.26) 
Observations 21,309 21,309 21,309 21,309 21,309 21,309 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.03 
       
Whole Sample:       
 Dependent variable:  
Explanatory variable: 
Housing 
Improvement Television Refrigerator
Cell 
Phone Stove Bicycle 
Credit Available in Village: 0.012 -0.001 0.009 0.005 -0.002 -0.005 
 (1.52) (0.12) (1.16) (0.74) (0.53) (1.13) 
Constant 0.078 0.002 0.007 0.003 -0.015 -0.007 
  (4.20)** -0.14 (2.24)* -1.23 -1.07 -0.92 
Observations 21,309 21,328 21,328 21,328 21,328 21,328 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.03 
       
       
Sample that takes Credit Immediately:      
 Dependent variable:  
Explanatory variable: 
Housing 
improvement Television Refrigerator
Cell 
Phone Stove Bicycle 
Credit Available in Village 0.030 -0.005 0.021 0.016 -0.008 0.001 
 (1.84) (0.30) (1.33) (0.93) (0.67) (0.04) 
Constant 0.015 0.026 0.027 0.010 0.003 0.000 
  (1.45) (1.98) (2.00) (1.08) (0.63) (0.01) 
Observations 4,070 4,070 4,070 4,070 4,070 4,070 
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.04 
All regressions use country/year dummies and village-level fixed effects.  
SEs clustered at the village level. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
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Table 3: Business Investment, Using Leads and Lags of the Uptake of Credit by Household and 
Credit Introduction into Village (Ghana and India)  
 
                                              ----- (Credit Uptake by Household)----           -----(Credit Introduced into Village)----- 
Explanatory variable: Busn. Invst BusStruc Inv. Busn Machine Busn. Invst BusStruc Inv Busn Mach
4 years before  0.006 0.008 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.008 
 (0.82) (1.92*) (0.14) (0.80) (0.00) (1.27) 
3 years before  0.008 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.79) (1.73*) (0.40) (0.36) (0.62) (0.27) 
2 years before  -0.003 0.014 -0.016 0.008 0.006 0.003 
 (-0.31) (1.97*) (-1.80) (0.73) (1.14) (0.38) 
1 years before  0.015 0.012 0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
 (1.50) (1.43) (0.64) (-0.32) (-0.10) (-0.46) 
Year of receipt 0.128 0.113 0.044 0.018 0.013 0.005 
 (6.85**) (6.72**) (3.77**) (1.10) (1.16) (0.46) 
1 year after  0.087 0.086 0.017 0.030 0.024 0.000 
 (5.10**) (4.80**) (1.05) (1.48) (1.78) (0.03) 
2 years after  0.078 0.063 0.029 0.034 0.028 0.022 
 (4.77**) (5.04**) (1.78) (1.92) (2.15*) (1.55) 
3 years after  0.038 0.026 0.014 0.027 0.011 0.019 
 (1.83*) (1.45) (0.84) (1.25) (1.12) (1.14) 
4 years after  0.040 0.045 0.024 0.028 0.007 0.025 
 (1.13) (1.94*) (0.54) (1.96*) (0.71) (1.95*) 
Constant 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.213 0.23 
  (2.86**) (2.35**) (2.35**) (2.51**) (11.02**) (11.82**) 
R-squared 0.166 0.120 0.096 0.157 0.103 0.095 
Observations 18,984 18,960 18.960 18,984 18,960 18.960 
All regressions use country/year dummies and village-level fixed effects.  
SEs clustered at the village level. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
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Table 4A: Housing Improvements, Using Leads and Lags of the Uptake of Credit by Household: 
(Ghana and Guatemala Only) 
Explanatory variable: 
Any Housing 
Improvement New Walls New Roof New Floor Electricity New Toilet 
4 years before receipt -0.008 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.003 
 (0.90) (1.12) (0.28) (0.31) (0.56) (0.73) 
3 years before receipt 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 -0.008 -0.005 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.97) (0.86) (1.50) (1.47) 
2 years before receipt -0.008 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.70) (0.63) (0.86) (0.63) (0.25) (0.46) 
1 years before receipt 0.004 0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.008 -0.005 
 (0.38) (1.40) (0.47) (0.46) (0.99) (1.19) 
Year of receipt 0.044 0.012 0.006 0.017 0.016 0.012 
 (3.70)** (2.25)* (1.20) (2.49)* (1.63) (1.86) 
1 year after receipt 0.048 0.02 0.011 0.017 0.017 0.002 
 (2.85)** (2.63)* (1.85) (1.75) (2.00) (0.34) 
2 years after receipt 0.028 0.018 0.003 0.028 0.008 -0.002 
 (1.78) (1.81) (0.46) (2.43)* (1.07) (0.35) 
3 years after receipt 0.015 0.008 0.000 0.039 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.94) (0.93) (0.06) (2.39)* (0.70) (0.13) 
4 years after receipt -0.002 0.033 0.004 0.008 0.008 -0.01 
 (0.07) (2.17)* (0.62) (0.65) (0.46) (3.38)** 
Constant 0.078 0.014 0.011 0.049 0.017 -0.026 
  (4.06)** (1.65) (0.97) (2.50)* (0.96) (1.66) 
       
Observations 15,928 15,459 15,640 15,123 14,973 15,349 
R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
All regressions use country/year dummies and village-level fixed effects.  
SEs clustered at the village level. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
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Table 4B: Housing Improvements, Using Leads and Lags of Provision of Credit to the Village: 
(Ghana and Guatemala Only) 
Explanatory variable: 
Any Housing 
Improvement New Walls New Roof New Floor Electricity New Toilet 
4 years before access 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (0.99) (1.31) (1.30) (1.13) (0.43) (0.30) 
3 years before access 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.010 -0.002 0.001 
 (1.46) (0.32) (0.06) (2.38)* (0.68) (0.39) 
2 years before access 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.32) (1.58) (1.28) (0.30) (1.03) (0.03) 
1 years before access -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.25) (0.45) (0.50) (0.80) (1.44) (0.56) 
Year of receipt 0.013 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.000 
 (1.08) (0.76) (1.52) (1.25) (1.41) (0.17) 
1 year after access 0.020 0.008 0.012 0.001 -0.004 0.005 
 (2.19)* (2.02)* (2.49)* (0.19) (0.99) (1.17) 
2 years after access 0.028 0.012 0.008 0.015 0.01 0.001 
 (2.24)* (2.21)* (2.08)* (1.77) (1.86) (0.31) 
3 years after access 0.020 -0.003 -0.005 0.007 0.002 0.008 
 (2.58)* (1.17) (2.20)* (1.21) (0.36) (1.82) 
4 years after access 0.011 0.004 -0.002 0.011 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.94) (0.84) (0.86) (1.42) (0.16) (0.56) 
Constant 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.001 
  (0.99) (1.31) (1.30) (1.13) (0.43) (0.30) 
Observations 15,592 15,139 15,327 14,871 14,707 15,052 
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
All regressions use country/year dummies and village-level fixed effects.  
SEs clustered at the village level. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
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Table 5: Tests for Supply-Side Endogeneity:  
(Ghana, India, and Guatemala) 
A. Is the pre-treatment level of outcomes a function of the order of rollout?   
 Dependent variable is year/village average LEVELS of:  
Explanatory variable: 
Home 
Improvement Television Refrigerator Stove Bicycle 
Cell 
Phone 
Year in which credit received -0.0002 0.0020 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 
 (0.18) (1.42) (0.61) (0.53) (0.40) (0.16) 
Constant 0.5443 -3.8961 -1.3035 -0.587 0.688 0.2536 
  (0.21) (1.42) (0.61) (0.52) (0.40) (0.16) 
Observations 726 726 726 726 726 726 
R-squared 0.2 0.19 0.11 0.31 0.17 0.23 
       
       
       
B. Is the pre-treatment rate of change of outcomes a function of the order of rollout?  
 Dependent variable is year/village average CHANGES in:  
Explanatory variable: 
Home 
Improvement Television Refrigerator Stove Bicycle 
Cell 
Phone 
Year in which credit received 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0000 
 (0.37) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.33) (0.01) 
Constant -1.3866 0.213 -0.7029 0.0552 0.7551 -0.1778 
  (0.37) (0.05) (0.20) (0.03) (0.33) (0.09) 
Observations 655 655 655 655 655 655 
R-squared 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.26 0.13 0.22 
       
       
       
C. Is the order of rollout being driven by pre-treatment shocks?    
 Dependent variable is individual observation on:  
Explanatory variable: 
Home 
improvement Television Refrigerator Stove Bicycle 
Cell 
Phone 
Dummy, year before credit 
offered -0.0118 -0.0163 -0.0304 0.0032 0.0252 -0.0102 
 (0.99) (0.96) (1.58) (0.46) (1.48) (0.54) 
Constant 0.0797 0.0743 -0.0324 0.052 0.0134 -0.0024 
  (2.31)* (2.30)* (1.57) (4.87)** (0.84) (0.13) 
Observations 774 774 774 774 774 774 
R-squared 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.27 0.16 0.24 
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Table 6: Test for Demand-Side Endogeneity: 
Interactions between lack of access and leads of uptake 
 Dependent variable:  
Explanatory variable: 
Home 
improvement Television Refrigerator Cell Phone Stove Bicycle 
2 years before receipt -0.011 -0.013 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006 0.002 
 (1.11) (1.40) (0.35) (0.92) (1.35) (0.24) 
1 year before receipt 0.009 -0.007 -0.005 0.008 -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.91) (0.51) (0.47) (0.88) (0.35) (0.83) 
Year of receipt 0.028 0.017 0.013 0.007 0.014 -0.002 
 (3.03)** (1.67) (1.83) (0.65) (1.92) (0.49) 
1 year after receipt 0.036 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.001 0.003 
 (3.37)** (0.70) (1.18) (0.50) (0.08) (0.63) 
2 years after receipt 0.017 -0.002 0.02 0.007 -0.004 0.013 
 (1.73) (0.12) (1.81) (0.58) (0.50) (1.27) 
2 years before receipt, no access 0.01 0.019 0.015 0.012 0.02 0.021 
 (0.89) (1.27) (0.85) (1.25) (1.51) (1.01) 
1 year before receipt, no access -0.004 -0.007 -0.016 -0.025 0 0.015 
  (0.24) (0.33) (0.97) (1.85) (0.02) (1.25) 
Constant 0.076 0.002 0.006 0.003 -0.015 -0.005 
  (3.89)** (0.17) (2.57)* (1.07) (1.03) (0.72) 
P-value on F-test that sum of         
(no access * leads) interactions 
is equal to zero: 
0.7696  0.6532  0.9618  0.4870  0.1626  0.2056  
 21309 21328 21328 21328 21328 21328 
R-squared 0.02  0.03  0.02  0.09  0.02  0.03  
All regressions use country/year dummies and village-level fixed effects, SEs clustered at the village level. 
Robust t statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
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Table 7: Test for Attrition Bias 
Falsification Tests, Before-After Credit Dummy Variables Interacted with Dropout Dummy: 
(Guatemala Only) 
 Dependent variable:  
Explanatory variables: 
Any Housing 
Improvement New Walls
New 
Roof 
New 
Floor 
New 
Electricity
New 
Toilet 
Actual Take-up of Credit: 0.02 0.012 -0.007 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.59) (0.65) (0.50) (0.14) (0.07) (0.03) 
Dropout dummy  -0.01 0.064 0.068 0.032 0.003 0.009 
 (0.43) (2.86)* (3.30)** (2.47)* (0.31) (1.30) 
Dropout * Take-up of Credit -0.033 0.033 0.028 -0.032 -0.004 0.038 
 (1.34) (1.69) (1.09) (1.35) (0.15) (1.66) 
Constant 0.078 0.003 -0.007 0.052 0.034 0.005 
  (6.43)** (0.14) (0.41) (5.04)** (2.98)* (0.52) 
Observations 3050 2635 2863 2558 2522 2736 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
       
Whole Sample:       
 Dependent variable:  
Explanatory variables: 
Any Housing 
Improvement New Walls
New 
Roof 
New 
Floor 
New 
Electricity
New 
Toilet 
Credit Available in Village 0.034 0.011 -0.016 -0.011 0.039 0.013 
 (1.19) (0.78) (1.13) (0.77) (3.58)** (0.94) 
Dropout dummy  -0.017 0.026 0.027 0.007 0.012 0.016 
 (0.59) (2.01) (2.53)* (0.37) (1.43) (2.08) 
Dropout * Credit Available -0.005 0.073 0.075 0.028 -0.017 0.004 
 (0.18) (1.65) (1.72) (2.11) (1.02) (0.53) 
Constant 0.08 0.012 0.002 0.058 0.032 0.004 
  (6.92)** (0.90) (0.17) (5.95)** (3.11)** (0.39) 
Observations 3050 2635 2863 2558 2522 2736 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 
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Table 8: Strongest Test for Causality in Housing Improvements 
Using Leads and Lags of Provision of Credit to the Village, weighted by dropout probability 
(Guatemala Only) 
Explanatory variable: 
Any Housing 
Improvement
New 
Walls New Roof 
New 
Floor 
New 
Electricity 
New 
Toilet 
4 years before access -0.008 -0.013 -0.033 0.000 0.000 -0.015 
 (0.32) (0.64) (2.13) (0.03) (0.01) (1.00) 
3 years before access -0.006 -0.05 -0.052 -0.006 -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.22) (1.79) (1.68) (0.28) (1.32) (1.22) 
2 years before access 0.018 -0.04 -0.037 -0.009 0.004 0.002 
 (0.77) (1.23) (1.21) (0.55) (0.23) (0.08) 
1 years before access 0.024 -0.025 -0.04 0.015 -0.016 0.012 
 (1.21) (1.08) (1.59) (1.08) (1.55) (1.18) 
Year of access 0.004 -0.015 -0.021 -0.002 0.036 -0.009 
 (0.22) (0.54) (0.96) (0.22) (2.29)* (0.98) 
1 year after access 0.015 -0.021 -0.054 -0.005 -0.02 0.009 
 (0.78) (1.08) (2.09) (0.45) (2.14) (0.54) 
2 years after access -0.001 0.002 -0.05 0.014 0.007 -0.013 
 (0.11) (0.07) (1.26) (0.83) (0.40) (0.67) 
3 years after access 0.071 0.008 -0.052 0.027 -0.001 0.038 
 (2.60)* (0.55) (1.38) (1.22) (0.08) (2.52)*
4 years after access 0.054 0.016 -0.026 0.013 -0.017 0.001 
 (2.20)* (0.48) (0.74) (0.55) (1.84) (0.04) 
Constant 0.051 0.01 -0.004 0.052 0.036 -0.004 
  (3.07)** (0.64) (0.31) (4.04)** (3.32)** (0.40) 
Observations 3,046 2,632 2,860 2,556 2,518 2,732 
R-squared 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
All regressions use country/year dummies and village-level fixed effects.  
SEs clustered at the village level. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
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